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Local Prosecutors and Corporate Crime 
by Michael L. Benson, Francis T. Cullen, and William J. Maakestad 
Crimes committed by and for business 
pose a serious threat to the health, safety, 
and financial welfare of consumers and 
workers as well as to the orderly function-
ing of the economy and the government. 
Commonly known as corporate or organi-
zational crimes, these offenses raise special 
problems .for detection, prosecution, and 
sanction. 1 Isolated efforts by individual 
enforcement agencies have proven inad-
equate against this type of crime, under-
scoring the need for a coordinated, 
multistrategy response from Federal, 
State, and local levels of government. 
Historically, the Federal Government has 
assumed primary responsibility for control-
ling corporate crime, but in the past two 
decades, local prosecutors have become 
increasingly concerned about this problem. 
In 1973 the National District Attorneys 
Association established an Economic 
Crime Committee to encourage local pros-
ecutors to enforce white-collar crime laws 
and to enhance their enforcement ability. 
By 1975, 43 district attorneys' offices were 
participating in the committee's Economic 
Crime Project. 
From the Director 
Local prosecutions of corporate crime, 
particularly crimes against the environment 
and consumer fraud, are becoming more 
widespread. Six out of 10 local prosecutors 
who responded to a recent National Institute 
of Justice survey reported increased num-
bers of corporate prosecutions by their 
offices. 
Once confined almost entirely to the Fed-
eral courts, local prosecutions of corporate 
crimes have increased steadily since the 
Economic Crime Project was established in 
1975 by the Economic Crime Committee of 
Since the Economic Crime Project was 
begun nearly 20 years ago, local re-
sponse to corporate white-collar crime 
has changed significantly. In the past, 
district attorneys concentrated almost 
exclusively on economic crimes such as 
consumer fraud. They are now pros-
ecuting a wider variety of cases, includ-
ing occupational safety violations and 
the illegal dumping of toxic waste. In 
nearly every State, prosecutors have 
sought criminal indictments against 
corporations, partnerships, and other 
business entities for noneconomic 
offenses. 
This Research in Brief summarizes a 
National Institute of Justice study of 
local prosecutors' work against corpo-
rate crime. For the study, corporate 
crime was defined as "a violation of a 
criminal statute either by a corporate 
entity or by its executives, employees, 
or agents acting on behalf of and for the 
benefit of the corporation, partnership, 
or other form of business entity." 
the National District Attorneys Association. 
As this NIJ Research in Brief points out, 
local district attorneys are now taking 
corporate defendants to court for a growing 
variety of offenses, including occupational 
safety violations and the illegal dumping of 
toxic waste. 
Local prosecutions of corporate offenders 
are not undertaken easily; as this report 
shows, the complex, often technical nature 
of crimes committed in an organizational 
setting can make them both costly and 
difficult to prosecute. And because 
The first component of the study was a 
mail survey of 632 district attorneys with 
jurisdictions located in or near urban ar-
eas. 2 Completed questionnaires were re-
ceived from 419 districts, a response rate 
of 66 percent. The survey data were then 
merged with economic, social , and official 
crime data for each jurisdiction. 3 The sec-
ond component of the study involved case 
studies in four jurisdictions: Cook County, 
Illinois; Los Angeles County, California; 
Dade County, Florida; and Nassau County, 
New York. In each jurisdiction prosecu-
tors, regulatory officials, and representa-
tives of various law enforcement agencies 
were interviewed regarding their views of 
corporate crime and their interactions with 
other law enforcement agencies. 
Trends In corporate crime 
prosecutions 
One conclusion is that local prosecution of 
corporate crime is becoming more wide-
spread. More than one-quarter of the sur-
vey respondents said that corporate 
prosecutions have increased during their 
successful prosecutions often require sub-
stantial time and labor, the availability of 
resources plays a significant role in local 
activity against corporate crime. 
In addition to reporting on the results of the 
survey, this Institute report offers suggestions 
that may improve cooperation among Fed-
eral, S~,aMJ.Ac~ ~9119i~s in combat~r~ 
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tenure in office. One-quarter reported that 
they expected to prosecute more corporate 
cases in the future. Less than 1 percent 
had seen or anticipated a decrease in 
prosecutions. 
Prosecutors in large jurisdictions (those 
with populations over 250,000) most fre-
quently reported increased rates of corpo-
rate prosecutions. Roughly 6 out of 10 
respondents in large jurisdictions said 
prosecutions had increased during their 
tenures in office, and a majority expected 
this trend to continue. 
Prevalence of corporate 
crime prosecutions 
In 1988 two-thirds of the survey respond-
ents said their offices prosecuted at least 
one of nine types of corporate crime (table 
1). Although local prosecutors handled a 
wider variety of corporate crimes in 1988 
than in previous years, economic crimes 
still made up the bulk of their corporate 
crime caseload. 
e Consumer fraud was the most frequent-
ly prosecuted corporate offense, with 41 
percent of the offices prosecuting at least 
one case of consumer fraud. 
• False claims and insurance fraud fol-
lowed as the most frequently prosecuted 
economic crimes, with 31 percent of the 
offices prosecuting at least one offense in 
these categories. 
HV6635B474 1993 
Local prosecutors and corporate crime 
e Only one type of noneconomic crime-
environmental offenses-was prosecuted 
as often as economic crime. In 1988, 31 
percent of the offices handled at least one 
environmental offense. 
Most districts did not have data on the 
specific number of corporate offenses 
handled in 1988. For this reason, the prev-
alence of local corporate crime prosecu-
tions can only be approximated (table 2). 
• Typically, 15 percent ofthe districts 
handled more than three consumer fraud 
cases a year, while 20 percent of the dis-
tricts handled one to three annually. 
e About 10 percent of local prosecutors 
typically handled more than three false 
claims, insurance fraud cases, or environ-
mental offenses per year. 
Prosecutors in the case study sites reported 
that most of their resources were allocated 
to combat economic offenses, but noted 
that environmental offenses were becom-
ing more prevalent. As one prosecutor 
said, "The danger from this environmental 
stuff is much greater than what we have to 
worry about from drugs." Another noted, 
· "A day does not go by without my hearing 
about some type of environmental issue on 
television or in the newspapers. The prob-
lems are immense." 
Tablet. Percentage of Offices Prosecuting Selected Corporate 
Crimes In 1988* 
Corporate crime Yes No 
Consumer fraud 41% 59% 
Securities fraud 22 78 
Insurance fraud 31 69 
Tax fraud 16 84 
False claims 31 69 
Workplace offenses 11 89 
Environmental offenses 31 69 
Illegal payments 16 84 
Unfair trade practices 8 92 
Any corporate offense 66 34 
• In 1988, did your office actually prosecute any of the following corporate offenses? 
2 
Variation In local corporate 
crime prosecution 
Because of their complex, technical nature, 
crimes committed in an organizational 
setting can be difficult to prosecute. Statis-
tical analysis revealed three significant 
causes for local variations in corporate 
crime prosecution: availability of re-
sources, community context, and regional 
differences. These all affected how ag-
gressive local prosecutors were in respond-
ing to corporate crime. 
Availability of resources. Because suc-
cessful prosecutions often require substan-
tial time and labor, the availability of 
resources has a significant influence on 
local activity against corporate crime. 
Large offices (as measured by the number 
of full-time attorneys) conducted more 
corporate prosecutions than small offices. 
Those offices that had joined an inter-
agency task force to combat white-collar 
or economic crime or had established a 
special unit tended to be more active than 
offices lacking such arrangements. 
Community context. The economic, 
demographic, and social makeup of the 
community also plays a significant role in 
determining the aggressiveness of local 
corporate crime prosecution. In the study, 
community context affected local prosecu-
tors' attention and reaction to certain types 
of offenses. For example, prosecutors in 
Nassau County, New York, cited illegal 
disposal of medical waste as a significant 
environmental problem, while prosecutors 
in Cook County, Illinois, cited illegal dis-
posal or abandonment of toxic chemicals 
by defunct metal-plating businesses as a 
typical problem. Local prosecutors tended 
to be sensitive to the specific problems, 
needs, and expectations of the communi-
ties in which they worked, much as are 
local police forces. 
Regional differences. Regional differ-
ences also affect the amount of local activ-
ity taken against corporate crime. In 
general, prosecutors in western States 
tended to be more active against most 
forms of corporate crime than their coun-
terparts in northeastern, midwestern, and 
southern States (table 3). Compared to 
offices in other regions, a larger percentage 
of western offices typically handled more . 
than three cases per year of most corporate 
crimes. 
Table 2. Frequency of Prosecutions In a Typical Year* 
and representatives from Federal, State, 
and local law enforcement agencies. 
Frequency 
Fewer than About 
1 case 1-3 cases 
Corporate crime Never per year per year 
Consumer fraud 32% 33% 20% 
Securities fraud 57 28 12 
Insurance fraud 38 39 15 
Tax fraud 61 25 8 
False claims 40 34 15 
Workplace offenses 68 25 5 
Environmental offenses 45 34 13 
Illegal payments 51 37 10 













• Creating special units for economic 
crimes, which allows prosecutors to 
develop the technical and legal expertise 
necessary to handle complex cases by con-
centrating on these types of crimes. 
This survey found that 24 percent of local 
prosecutors were using one or the other (or 
both) of these special control strategies. 
• Twenty-three percent of the respond-
ents had a special in-house unit in their 
office for investigating and prosecuting 
economic or white-collar crimes. 
• Eight percent were involved in an 
interagency task force or strike group fo-
cusing on economic or white-collar crime. 
*Typically, how often does your office prosecute the corporate criminal offenses listed 
• Of those involved in an interagency 
task force, 75 percent also had a special 
unit. below? 
The higher level of activity among pros-
ecutors in the West may be due to the 
types of offices and communities they 
-;erve. First, the western offices sampled 
#ere located in districts with compara-
tively large populations. Along with their 
greater population size, these districts may 
have more business activity, and therefore, 
more potential offenses than districts in 
other regions. Second, the western offices 
tended to have more attorneys and investi-
gators than offices in other regions. Third, 
legal or cultural factors unique to western 
States may cause local prosecutors to take 
a comparatively more vigorous approach 
to corporate crime. However, the true 
cause of regional variation remains uncl~ar 
and deserves further investigation. 4 
Discovery of corporate 
offenses 
District attorneys learned about corporate 
misconduct through a variety of official 
and unofficial sources. Most often, cases 
came to the attention of prosecutors after 
complaints by business and citizen victims. 
The second most common sources were 
the local police and State regulatory 
agencies, followed by the State police and 
State attorney general's offices. Federal 
1w enforcement and regulatory agencies 
did not refer many cases to local prosecu-
tors (table 4). 
Networking and special units 
The Economic Crime Project discovered 
two ways for local prosecutors to augment 
resources and increase efficiency against 
corporate crime: 
• Using interagency teams to analyze, 
investigate, and prosecute complex white-
collar crimes. These networks typically 
include prosecutors; regulatory officials; 
The use of special control strategies varied 
by size of district and region of the country 
and was more prevalent in large jurisdic-
tions than in small ones. 
• Fourteen of the 30 largest offices were 
involved in an interagency task force, 
compared to only one of the 30 smallest 
offices. 
• More than 70 percent of the respond-
ents in large jurisdictions used one or more 
Table 3. Percentage of Offices Prosecuting More Than Three 
Cases per Year, by Region* 
Region 
Crime South West Northeast Midwest 
Consumer fraud 11% 42% 16% 9% 
Securities fraud 3 9 2 3 
Insurance fraud 8 15 13 6 
Tax fraud 7 9 2 5 
False claims 9 30 12 7 
Workplace offenses 3 2 0 0 
Environmental offenses 3 33 9 6 
Illegal payments 2 2 5 2 
Unfair trade practices 28 0 2 
• Typically, how often does your office prosecute the corporate criminal offenses listed 
below? 
3 
Table 4. Frequency of Referrals From Selected Sources* 
Frequency 
Fewer than About More than 
1 case 1-3 cases 3 cases 
Referral source Never per year per year per year 
Local police 25% 40% 20% 15% 
State police 41 37 16 6 
State attorney general 40 37 16 6 
State regulatory agency 28 39 20 14 
Federal regulatory agency 71 22 6 1 
U.S. Attorney's Office 72 23 5 0.3 
FBI 63 29 7 1 
Business victims 22 37 19 21 
Citizen victims 18 37 23 22 
Public interest groups 59 28 9 4 
• In general, how often do the sources listed below refer potential corporate criminal 
cases to your office for investigation or prosecution? 
of the special strategies, compared to less 
than 10 percent of their counterparts in 
small districts. 
• Special units and interagency networks 
were more common in western and, to a 
lesser extent, northeastern districts than in 
midwestern or southern districts. 
Cooperation with other 
agencies 
Jointly coordinated investigations are an 
integral part of networking. Local prosecu-
tors reported collaborating most often with 
local police and State regulatory agencies 
on joint investigations of corporate crimes 
(table 5). 
• The highest number, 38 percent, re-
ported working with local police on one or 
more corporate cases annually. 
• Twenty-eight percent said they worked 
with State regulatory agencies on one or 
more corporate cases each year. 
• At least once a year, more than 20 per-
cent of prosecutors worked with the State 
attorney general's office and State police. 
• Almost 20 percent of prosecutors coop-
erated with another jurisdiction at least 
once a year. 
Joint investigations with Federal agencies 
were rare. Less than 10 percent of the 
respondents said they worked with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
U.S. Attorney's Office, or a Federal regu-
latory agency as often as once a year. In 
three out of five offices, prosecutors never 
worked with these Federal agencies. 
Some prosecutors interviewed during the 
case study visits faulted Federal investiga-
tive agencies for not referring cases to 
local officials. Although local prosecutors 
recognized the need for Federal agencies to 
focus on large cases, they believed that 
some small, unpursued cases may have 
had significant local impact. While ac-
knowledging different priorities, the pros-
ecutors believed that too many cases have 
escaped enforcement. Better communica-
tion between Federal and local officials 
could provide prosecutors with leads to 
pursue local cases not pursued by Federal 
agencies. 
However, despite growing recognition of 
the seriousness of corporate crime and 
widespread knowledge that traditional 
methods of law enforcement are inad-
equate, the development of coordinated, 
multistrategy responses from Federal, 
State, and local governments remains more 
an ideal than a reality. 
4 
Constraints on prosecutorial · 
discretion 
Before deciding to proceed with a corpo-
rate case, prosecutors reported they consid-
ered many factors, including the type of 
offense, resources available, actions of 
other agencies, preferences of victims, and 
potential impact of the prosecution on the 
local community. Some of these factors 
limited the prosecutor's willingness to 
proceed with a corporate prosecution, 
while others increased it. 
Factors that limited prosecution. The 
most important factors limiting local pros-
ecution of corporate crimes were inad-
equate resources, legal constraints, and 
availability of alternative remedies. 
• Seventy percent of the survey respond-
ents were less willing to prosecute if State 
or Federal regulatory agencies had already 
acted in a case. 
• About 60 percent stated they probably 
would limit their willingness to prosecute 
if personnel were insufficient. 
• More than 50 percent said they would 
be less willing to prosecute if victims were 
not cooperative or if criminal intent was 
difficult to establish in a corporate context. 
The inadequacies of resources at the local 
level became apparent during visits to the 
case study sites. Even in relatively large 
well-to-do offices, prosecutors often did 
not have basic equipment. For example, 
prosecutors in one of the largest districts 
lamented that they did not have dicta-
phones and that memorandums, briefs, and 
other documents had to be written in long-
hand before office secretaries could type 
them. 
An investigator in the same district pointed 
out that a car phone and an answering 
machine would greatly improve her effi-
ciency and productivity, enabling her to 
receive and return calls as she traveled 
around the city working her cases. Without 
a phone, her time in the car was, as she put 
it, "mostly wasted." She and other inter-
viewees noted that these items are standard 
equipment in all but the smallest private 
law firms. 
On a more substantive level, prosecutors in 
one district commented that their ability t( 
develop and dispose of environmental 
:ases was seriously diminished by the lack 
uf access to adequate laboratory facilities. 
For example, delays in identifying poten-
tially toxic substances limited the prosecu-
tors' options in responding to cases of 
illegal disposal or handling of toxic wastes. 
As one prosecutor explained, to "fmd out 
what's in a substance 6 months later is too 
late in an environmental case. How can 
you walk in [to a court) and [ask] for in-
junctive relief and say there's an immedi-
ate need to close this [business] down 
when you've waited 6 months? How can 
you do anything criminally-and talk 
about how bad this is-if our office lets it 
go 6 months at a time?'' 
Factors that increased prosecution. The 
factors most likely to increase a prosecu-
tor's willingness to proceed against a cor-
porate wrongdoer involved the nature of 
the offense and the characteristics of the 
offender. More than 90 percent of the 
respqndents indicated they would be more 
willing to prosecute cases that involved the 
following: 
• Physical harm to victims. 
• Evidence of multiple offenses. 
• Large numbers of victims. 
• Substantial economic harm. 
Only slightly less important were the 
education and deterrence functions of 
prosecution. More than 85 percent said the 
"need to deter other potential corporate 
offenders" would increase their willingness 
to prosecute. About 75 percent felt simi-
larly about the "need to demonstrate 
publicly that the law applies equally to all 
offenders." 
Goals of prosecution 
In general, district attorneys pursued dif-
ferent goals when prosecuting corporate as 
opposed to ordinary street crimes. In the 
case of a traditional street crime committed 
by an individual, the most important objec-
tive for local prosecutors tended to be 
either deterrence or incapacitation. 
• About 33 percent of the respondents 
rated incapacitation or deterrence of the 
offender as the most important objective in 
lJrosecuting ordinary street crimes. 
~ Orily 16 percent rated deterrence of 
other street criminals as the most important 
objective in this type of case. 
In contrast, 40 percent of the respondents 
ranked deterrence of other offenders as the 
most important objective in pursuing cor-
porate crimes. In the view of one experi-
enced prosecutor: 
There's only one advantage to cor-
porate prosecutions-in terms of its 
deterrence value, one prosecution is 
worth 500. I've prosecuted maybe 
50 murderers, and I've never de-
terred a street murderer. I've prob-
ably prosecuted one industrial 
murderer, and I think we've deterred 
a whole lot of people-at least woke 
them up-so some people are trying 
to do the right thing. So even with a 
lack of resources, one corporate 
prosecution is much more valuable 
than one street crime prosecution. 
Addressing the same issue, another 
prosecutor commented on environmental 
crime: 
Everybody agrees that criminal 
prosecution is the big hammer on 
environmental people. The proof is 
how loud they squeal when you file 
the case, and boy, do they squeal. 
'Despite the supposed moral neutrality of 
many corporate offenses, a notable propor-
tion of prosecutors felt that corporate of-
fenders deserve to be punished. Indeed, 35 
percent ranked retribution as either the first 
or second most important objective in a 
corporate crime conviction. In contrast, 
less than 10 percent ranked retribution as 
the most important objective in prosecut-
ing street criminals. 
Most of the prosecutors interviewed at the 
case study sites echoed these opinions, 
arguing that corporate offenders were more 
easily deterred than ordinary street offend-
ers. Furthermore, prosecutors expressed a 
strong sense of moral outrage over the 
"arrogance" and "callousness" of many 
business offenders, particularly those in-
volved in repeated and intentional viola-
tions. For these offenders, the impositidn 
of criminal sanctions for the sake of deter-
rence and retribution was regarded as 
appropriate, necessary, and deserved. 
The prosecutor as 
problem solver 
While acknowledging the importance of 
convicting and punishing the guilty, some 
prosecutors interviewed at the case study 
sites articulated a broader concept of their 
role in the criminal process. In their view, 
the prosecutor's central function is reduc-
tion of criminal activity; deterrence is not 
merely a hoped-for byproduct of the pun-
ishment process. So, rather than devote 
themselves exclusively to the development 
of prosecutable cases, these prosecutors 
attempt to control criminal activity through 
alternative means, an approach that has 
been called "the prosecutor as problem 
Table 5. Frequency of Joint Investigations With Selected Agencies* 
Frequency 
Fewer than About More than 
1 case 1-3 cases 3 cases 
Agency Never per year per year per year 
Local police 29% 33% 22% 16% 
State police 45 33 16 7 
State attorney general 39 39 16 5 
State regulatory agency 35 36 16 12 
Federal regulatory agency 70 23 6 
U.S. Attorney's Office 67 26 6 2 
FBI 61 29 7 3 
Another prosecutor 44 35 18 3 
* How often does your office cooperate on joint investigations of corporate crimes with 
the agencies listed below? 
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solver."5 Although it was more the excep-
tion than the rule, the case studies uncov-
ered evidence that such an approach is not 
uncommon among local prosecutors. 
For example, this strategy was used in a 
case involving a well-respected corpora-
tion that had violated a State law govern-
ing the transportation and disposal of toxic 
materials. Although there was enough 
evidence to pursue a criminal indictment, 
the prosecutor elected not to file charges. 
Instead, he negotiated an agreement in 
which the corporation paid a substantial 
civil fine, donated money to a local hazard-
ous waste project, and reimbursed the 
entire cost of the investigation. The money 
from the civil fme was used to fund a 
conference on environmental problems for 
law enforcement and regulatory officials. 
In this case, the prosecutor believed that 
this approach both educated and deterred 
other potential offenders, while the confer-
ence fostered environmental awareness 
among local officials. Preventing other 
corporate environmental violations took 
precedence here over enforcing the law 
against a particular offender. 
Policy implications 
In dealing with corporate offenders, local 
prosecutors often fmd themselves compet-
ing with well-fmanced and well-staffed 
law frrms with vast fmancial and person-
nel resources, which can put up stiff legal 
obstacles for prosecutors to overcome. 
The effort is often expensive and time-
consuming, especially for prosecutors who 
have limited staff and are facing these 
challenges for the first time. The following 
ideas on consolidating resources may be 
worthy of exploration. 
Sharing information. Local prosecutors 
cited a need for a centralized information 
clearinghouse and brief bank to allow 
prosecutors to benefit from the collective 
knowledge and experience of their col-
leagues nationwide. For example, prosecu-
tors in small communities could draw on 
the experience and wisdom of prosecutors 
in large urban centers. Such a clearing-
house could also contain information on 
alternative sanctions, innovative sentenc-
ing, and other enforcement techniques. It 
would be especially useful in relatively 
new areas of prosecution such as environ-
men~ and workplace-related crimes. 
Automation. The potential of computers 
to coordinate work among investigators in 
different agencies could be more fully 
explored. Agencies often have cases stored 
in a computer data base, but have no way 
of knowing what cases other agencies are 
working on. A centralized computer data 
bank might be particularly useful to local 
prosecutors in situations involving certain 
types of financial fraud or in cases in 
which victims are located in widely scat-
tered areas and offenders are mobile. 
Many law enforcement agencies now use 
computers for record keeping and case 
management. These computer files could 
tell investigators when someone in their 
own agency is working on a particular 
case, thus reducing duplication of effort 
and facilitating information sharing. 
Computer networks. Some prosecutors 
and investigators suggested that a local 
computer network linking agencies could 
provide access to a common data base of 
ongoing investigations and cases. The data 
base entries could contain information on 
the investigator (for example; name, tele-
phone number, and agency) and informa-
6 
tion on the case (for example, victims, 
suspects, and modus operandi). Investiga-
tors could use this data base to obtain both 
information on the case and the name of 
the investigator to coordinate activities. 
Such a network would be particularly 
useful in large urban areas where multiple 
agencies in different jurisdictions often 
work in geographical proximity. 
Many technical details would require care-
ful consideration. For example, when a 
computer network is installed, files would 
need to be protected so that only the inves-
tigator entering a case into the data base 
could alter information pertaining to it; , 
other investigators would need appropriate 
security clearances to read a file without 
altering it. 
Regional laboratories. Regional laborato-
ries to serve multiple local jurisdictions 
would make economic sense for hard-
pressed prosecutors, and the feasibility of 
setting up such laboratories to analyze 
chemical and environmental evidence 
should be explored. These laboratories 
could analyze and identify chemical 
samples quickly, thus enabling local pros-
ecutors to respond to cases that Federal 
agencies may deem too small or too local 
in impact to pursue. 
Publicizing of prosecutions. Finally, local 
prosecutors and other law enforcement 
agencies could take advantage of height-
ened public concern over corporate crime 
by publicizing their prosecutions of such 
offenses. The public needs to hear that 
local prosecutors regard these crimes as 
serious and to learn how to identify and 
report them. Ultimately, effective law 
enforcement depends on the support of 
concerned citizens who are willing to 
become involved. 
otes 
1. Corporate crime is a form of white-
collar crime. The distinctive feature of 
corporate crime is that the offense is com-
mitted primarily for the benefit of an on-
going legitimate business enterprise, rather 
than for the individual who carries out the 
offense. 
2. The sample was drawn from a mailing 
list provided by the National District Attor-
neys Association. Districts were classified 
as urban if they were located in a Metro-
politan Statistical Area (MSA), as defmed 
by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
3. Data were abstracted from the County 
and City Data Book ( 1988), Files on Dis-
kette. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
4. A multiple regression analysis not dis-
cussed in this Brief confirmed the impor-
tance of resources, community context, 
and regional location in determining levels 
of activity against corporate crime. The 
dependent variable in the regression analy-
sis was a scale measuring the overall level 
of activity against corporate crime. To 
construct the scale, the prosecutors' re-
sponses to the question on how often the 
office typically prosecutes the selected 
corporate crimes (see table 2) were as-
signed ordinal ranks and summed. The 
independent variables were number of 
attorneys, presence of a special unit, level 
of retail employment, and region. All of 
the independent variables exerted statisti-
cally significant effects and collectively 
explained 40 percent of the variance in the 
activity scale. 
5. Goldstock, R., 1991. "The Prosecutor as 
Problem Solver." Occasional Paper from 
the Center for Research in Crime and 
Justice, X. New York University School of 
Law. 
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